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THE JUVENILE JUSTICE COUNTERREVOLUTION:

RESPONDING TO COGNITIVE DISSONANCE IN THE LAW'S
VIEW OF THE DECISION-MAKING CAPACITY OF MINORS
DonaldL. Beschle*
INTRODUCTION

The dramatic recent decrease in the overall incidence of crime' has not reduced the level of public anxiety over juvenile crime.2 Indeed, there seems to
be a clear nationwide trend, fueled by public outrage, toward toughening the
legal system's approach toward the prosecution and punishment of juvenile
offenders. The rehabilitative model of juvenile justice that was adopted by
most states around the turn of the century is under attack, and a growing number of states now provide that certain juveniles, classified either by their age or
the seriousness of their offense, will be subject to the full severity of the adult
criminal legal system.3 Defenders of the juvenile justice alternative have been
largely unsuccessful in preventing the erosion of its jurisdiction.
Why has the defense of the separate juvenile justice system been so
ineffective? It seems clear that the public has largely lost faith in the
rehabilitative ideal as a foundation for any penal system, adult or juvenile.4
Professor of Law, John Marshall Law School, Chicago, IL.
From 1992 through 1996, the annual number of criminal offenses reported by law enforcement agencies nationwide was down by 6.7%; the rate per 100,000 inhabitants was down 10.3%. See FED. BUREAU O1
INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 1996: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 7

(1997). Violent crime is dovm more sharply. Id. at 12.
2 Erich Lotke wrote:
The headlines create the impression of a nation in crisis. Juvenile homicide hits all-time high,
they declare. Scourge of youth violence sweeping the nation. Politicians lament the death of our
youth and vow to keep neighborhoods safe. Teachers warn students to shun attractive clothing,
fearing they will be shot by children who plan to make it their own. Rarely have alarm bells
rung so loudly or so long: even good news like the recent decline in juvenile homicide was followed by warnings that the worst is yet to come.
Eric R. Lotke, Youth Homicide: Keeping Perspective on How Many Children Kill, 31 VAL. U. L. REv. 395,
395 (1997).
3 See Marygold S. Melli, Juvenile Justice Reform in Context, 1996 Wis. L. REv. 375, 390-95.
4 Thus, the 1980s saw a paradigm shift in public and legislative opinion that had at its center the presumption that "[c]rime was not committed by offenders who were sick, but by criminals who made free-will
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But what has replaced rehabilitation in the public mind as the overriding goal
of the juvenile justice system? Many would say deterrence. If this were so,
we would expect debate over the optimal system of juvenile (or adult) justice
to proceed along rational, empirical lines, with people's opinions open to
modification in light of the evidence provided concerning the presence or
absence of the deterrent effect of various penal approaches. But empirical
evidence seems curiously ineffective in softening public attitudes toward
punishment. This is nowhere more evident than in the ongoing debate over the
death penalty. The lack of evidence of its deterrent effect has not led to a
decrease in public support of executions While death penalty proponents
may continue to express confidence in its deterrent effect in spite of contrary
evidence, 6 it seems more likely that what is actually happening is a resurgence
of support for the concept of retribution, the idea that a crime demands
punishment commensurate with the guilt of the offender, regardless of its
wider deterrent effects, and regardless of its rehabilitative potential. While the
prominence of retributive thought may be most evident in the death penalty
debate, there is no reason to doubt that it exerts power elsewhere, including the
debate over appropriate forms of juvenile justice.
A sophisticated retributionism does not mindlessly pattern the punishment
after the criminal act; it also takes into account the level of culpability 9f the
criminal.7 Thus, an individual or society committed to the notion of retribution
decisions to commit crime." Alida V. Merlo & Peter J. Benekos, Adopting Conservative Correctional Policies to the Economic Realities of the 1990s, 6 CRIM. JUST. POL. REV. 1, 3 (1992). The new paradigm rejected rehabilitation as "coddling of criminals." Id.
5 The weight of the evidence fails to demonstrate any positive correlation between the presence or
frequency of executions and the achievement or maintenance of low murder rates. See, e.g., KILMAN SHIN,
DEATH PENALTY AND CIUME 1-71 (1978); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON J. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE
LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL 186-90 (1973). Yet majorities continue to favor the death penalty, at
least in the abstract. See William J. Bowers et al., A New Look at Public Opinion on CapitalPunishment:
What Citizens and LegidatorsPrefer, 22 AM. J. CRiM. L. 77, 89 (1994). Bowers and his colleagues are
critical of the methodology of these surveys, and demonstrate that when people are asked specifically to
compare the death penalty to life imprisonment with no chance of parole, support for capital punishment
falls off sharply. See id. at 90-91.
6 Although a decidedly minority view, there has been some social science support for the proposition
that the death penalty is an effective deterrent. See Isaac Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of CapitalPunishment: A Question of Life and Death, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 397 (1975); Isaac Ehrlich, Deterrence: Evidence
and Inference, 85 YALE L.J. 209 (1975). But empirical evidence is most likely less significant than the
strong intuition that capital punishment must deter. Ernest van den Haag, for example, has written: "Even
though statistical demonstrations are not conclusive... I believe that capital punishment is likely to deter
more than other punishments because people fear death more than anything else.... Whatever people fear
most is likely to deter most." Ernest van den Haag, The Death Penalty Once More, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
957, 965-66 (1985).
7 Thus "responsibility is as a general rule tied to culpability ....
Attribution of responsibility to a
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could nevertheless justify leniency toward an offender who lacked full capacity to appreciate the criminality and consequences of his act.' To the extent
that minors are regarded as less than fully capable, they can also be regarded as
less than fully culpable. A paternalistic approach to juvenile crime may comfortably coexist with the retributive impulse. But if the legal system, in a wide
variety of contexts, rejects paternalism toward adolescents, and respects their
right to make significant life choices, it becomes much more difficult to maintain that an adolescent choice to engage in crime should be met with anything
other than the response given to a similar decision made by an adult. A lesser
response would be inappropriately paternalistic, and demonstrate a lack of respect for the young criminal himself.
This Article will explore the possibility that as the legal system recognizes
more and more autonomy rights belonging to teenagers in a wide range of noncriminal matters, it inevitably creates a dissonance with the idea that in the
criminal sphere, paternalism is still appropriate. This dissonance is evident at
both ends of the political spectrum. The stereotypical liberal calls for expanded recognition of adolescents' rights in a wide range of civil contexts,
while defending a juvenile justice system that is based on the premise that an
adolescent's choice to commit a crime is rendered less culpable because of the
adolescent's age. In contrast, the stereotypical conservative will call for full
application of adult penalties to adolescent criminals, but will deny the right of
teenagers to make decisions that must be respected by the law in a wide variety
of other contexts, presumably on the grounds that one so young cannot be fully
capable of making such significant choices.
Many legal commentators remain focused on their own special area of
expertise. They take little notice of how trends in other fields may impact on
their own, or how their own positions on specific issues may spill over into
other fields. But it seems unlikely that the legal system as a whole, or even the
public opinion upon which it largely rests, can easily be comfortable with a
significant amount of dissonance. Social science has demonstrated that
individuals are made uncomfortable when they hold two inconsistent

person for inadequate performance of a social task becomes meaningless if performance was impossible due
to circumstances beyond the person's control." EDGAR BODENHEIMER, PHILOSOPHY OF RESPONSIBILITY 9
(1980). For an overview of the history and philosophy of the concept of retribution, see generally MARvIN
HENBERG, RETRIBUTION (1990).
8 Punishment of one who did not exercise free will in choosing to commit the offense may be justified,
but only by resort to some sort of consequentialist theory. See BODENHEIMER, supra note 7,at 15-17.

HeinOnline -- 48 Emory L. J. 67 1999

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

(Vol. 48

opinions. 9 They react, consciously or unconsciously, to resolve the conflict
and make their overall world view consistent.'0 Society at large, and its legal
system, must feel the same pressure. Thus, we must face the possibility that
the movement away from a separate juvenile justice system based upon the
ideal of rehabilitation may be accelerated, if not caused, by the overall increase
in the willingness of the legal system to recognize adolescent autonomy.
Perhaps it is time to face the dissonance in the typical liberal and conservative
positions on adolescent autonomy. If teenagers are accorded autonomy rights
on the assumption that they are capable of making choices as well as adults,
then perhaps there is little justification for a separate juvenile justice system.
And conversely, if an adolescent's choice to commit a crime should be
"respected" by subjecting it to the same treatment given an adult's decision,
there is little justification for denying autonomy rights to teenagers in other
legal contexts. This Article explores this problem.
First, Part I of this Article sets out a brief overview of the history of the legal system's treatment of juvenile crime, and Part II discusses the various rationales behind society's response to crime in general, with a particular focus
on the recent revival of interest in the notion of retribution. Then, Part Im
gives a brief overview of the law's treatment of adolescent autonomy claims
outside of the criminal context. Part IV explores the existing social science
evidence on whether there is an empirical difference in the capacity of adolescents and adults to make significant life choices-a difference that might support paternalistic treatment of those decisions by adolescents when such treatment for adults would be rejected. Unfortunately, while the existing evidence
is suggestive and somewhat helpful, it is not conclusive. Finally, Part V of this
Article discusses implications of these questions for the future, and the need
for further evidence on the subject of adolescent capacity and further thought
by citizens and lawmakers about the implications of that evidence on the question of how paternalistic the legal system, including but not limited to the juvenile justice system, should be.

9 This theory of "cognitive dissonance" was developed largely by Leon Festinger. See generally LEON
FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957).

1( See id. at 2-3. This theory has been applied within a number of legal contexts, such as the tendency
of workers to underestimate the risks involved in their chosen employment, see George A. Akerlof & William T. Dickens, The Economic Consequences of Cognitive Dissonance,72 AM. ECON. REv. 307, 307-08
(1982), and the tendency of potential criminals to downplay the risks and harms involved in their chosen
offenses, see Elliot Aronson & J. Merrill Carlsmith, Effect of the Severity of Threat on the Devaluation of
ForbiddenBehavior, 66 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL 584 (1963).
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I. JUVENILE JUSTICE-REFORM AND COUNTERREFORM

Before the last years of the nineteenth century, there was no separate system of juvenile justice. The common law and early statutory schemes classified people as those capable of forming criminal intent, who were subject to
the full force of the criminal law, and those incapable of forming such intent,
who were outside the reach of the penal system." With respect to age, a bright
line was drawn at the "age of reason." Children under the age of seven were
held legally incapable of criminal intent.12 Children over the age of fourteen
were held fully responsible for their acts." Those between the ages of seven
and fourteen would be presumed incapable of forming criminal intent, but the
state was permitted to rebut this presumption. 4 But the choice, whether based
upon age alone or a case-by-case determination, was limited to either the complete absence of criminal responsibility or treatment indistinguishable from
that given to adult offenders.' 5
In the second half of the eighteenth century and the early decades of the
nineteenth, a considerable amount of thought was devoted to the general topic
of penology. Enlightenment thinkers argued, with some success, that the
primary goal of the criminal law and the penal system should be rehabilitation,
rather than mere retribution or deterrence. 6 While this led to one major
!

Thus, Bracton wrote, in the thirteenth century:
[A] crime is not committed unless the will to harm be present ....And then there is what can be
said about the child and the madman, for the one is protected by his innocence of design, the
other by the misfortune of his deed. In misdeeds we look to the will and not the outcome.

NORMAN J. FINKEL, INsANrrY ON TRIAL 8 (1988). Finkel also explains the influence of the Church's definidon of sin upon the common law's concept of crime. See id. at 3-12.
12 See Margaret May, Innocence and Experience: The Evolution of the Concept of Juvenile Delinquency in the Mid-Nineteenth Century, in 3 CRIME AND JUSTICE IN AMERICAN HISTORY: DELINQUENCY AND

DISORDERLY BEHAvIoR 46,47-48 (Eric H. Monkkonen ed., 1991).
13 See id.
14 See id.
15 As May stated:
Age by itself gave no right to special treatment .... Young offenders were liable for all the
main forms of punishment ... though individual magistrates might exercise a compassionate
discretion [in reducing the severity of punishments]. But such clemency was only a variant of a
policy applied to all offenders in the early nineteenth century in the face of the stringent penal
code,

Id. at 48.
16 These arguments tended to have strong religious, as well as rationalist, overtones: the rehabilitation
of criminals would entail their religious conversion. See Randall McGowan, The Well-Ordered Prison:
England1780-1865, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON 79, 85-97 (Norval Morris & David J. Rothman
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enduring change, the replacement of physical punishment by prison as the
normal form of criminal sanction, 17 the rehabilitative ideal failed to maintain its
prominence and began to fade as early as the second half of the nineteenth
century. Several reasons may be cited for this change of heart. No doubt the
expense of operating a rehabilitative penal system and the failure of the
rehabilitative model to produce clear results played a prominent role.'9 But on
a deeper level, the failure of the rehabilitative model to satisfy the nearly
universal instinct that culpable wrongdoing calls for a response that is
unambiguously punitive, rather than principally therapeutic, may have played
just as important a role. Although penologists and others would continue to
give at least lip service to the rehabilitative ideal well into the twentieth
century,' it seems clear that the basic response of the contemporary penal
system when dealing with adult offenders is to calibrate punishment so that it
reflects the seriousness of the offense, rather than the degree of rehabilitation
required by the offender.2
But as the rehabilitative ideal faded in mainstream penology, it retained
strength, and was able to carve out a separate niche, in the development of the

eds., 1995). Similar reforms took place in the United States in the early nineteenth century. See David J.
Rothman, Perfecting the Prison: United States 1789-1865, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON, supra,
at 111, 116-24.
17 See Pieter Spierenburg, The Body and the State: Early Modern Europe, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF
THE PRISON, supra note 16, at 49. Physical punishment, not only of criminals, but also of children, wives,
military and naval personnel, and others, was the target of sustained attack by social reformers in the early
nineteenth century. See generally MYRA C. GLENN, CAMPAIGNS AGAINST CORPORAL PUNISHMENT (1984).
18 See Edgardo Rotman, The FailureofRefornv United States, 1865-1965, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF
THE PRISON, supranote 16, at 169-84.
19 See id.
20 Thus, even an advocate of rehabilitation such as Norval Morris has advocated separating rehabilitative programs-that is, programs whose purpose is to change the offender for the better, from punishment,
which is meant to deter and indicate the community's sense of justice. Morris contends that rehabilitation is
likely to succeed only when given to those who volunteer and show a willingness to reform. Thus, while
prisons can and should provide opportunities for rehabilitation, their purpose is not to rehabilitate. See
NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 12-20 (1974).
21 The "optimism and ... relative prosperity of the 1950s," coupled with relatively low crime rates
through the early 1960s, gave rise to a revival of rehabilitative emphasis in corrections in the 1950s and
1960s. See Rotman, supra note 18, at 189-91. Surveys have found continuing public support for rehabilitative approaches, at least toward certain types of offenders. See Francis T. Cullen et al., Public Support for
CorrectionalTreatment: The Tenacity ofRehabilitativeIdeology, 17 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 6 (1990).
22 As a result of "get tough" policies, the prison population in the United States has more than doubled
since the mid-1980s. See TODD R. CLEAR & GEORGE F. COLE, AMERICAN CORRECTIONS 462-69 (1994).
Kathlyn Taylor Gaubatz finds a puzzling public consensus: "[fin an era of falling crime rates and increased
tolerance toward other forms of deviance and social change, still the vast majority of the American public
supports harsh penal policies." KATHLYN TAYLOR GAUBATZ, CRIME INTHE PUBLIC MIND 155 (1995).
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juvenile court system. In the last decade of the nineteenth century and the
early years of the twentieth, states established separate judicial systems to deal
with criminal offenses committed by minors.2 With rehabilitation as their
stated goal, these courts were empowered to act in a way that combined the
perceived advantages of procedural informality and individualized tailoring of
remedies. 4 Juvenile court judges were typically given broad discretion to use
probation, referral to a social services agency, or institutional commitment to
deal with offenders; even the harshest treatments would typically last only until the juvenile offender became an adult.5 Juvenile offenses, unlike the typical adult offense, would ultimately be expunged from the adolescent's record,
leaving no permanent criminal stigma.2 The system was so distinct from the
normal criminal proceeding that it was common to classify delinquency proceedings as civil, rather than criminal, in nature. The role of the state, it was
said, was not prosecutorial adversary of the juvenile, but rather parens patriae.27
This system prevailed for more than six decades, but in 1967, the Supreme
Court initiated a serious reconceptualization of juvenile justice in In re Gault.2
While the paternalism that formed the basis of the juvenile justice system often
worked to the benefit of young offenders by mitigating their punishments, 2 the
flexibility that it provided to courts and law enforcement personnel often put
juveniles at a severe disadvantage during the stages of the proceedings prior to

23 See NEGLEY K. TEETERS & JOHN OTTO REINEMANN, THE CHALLENGE OF DELINQUENCY 282-90

(1950).
24 See id. at 290-328.

25 See id. at 328-33. As early as their 1950 book, Teeters and Reinemann note the presence of political
attempts to limit the jurisdiction of juvenile courts on the grounds that juvenile court procedures and punishments constituted "coddling" of young criminals. Id. at 338-42.
26 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 145-67
(1980). "Confidentiality of records pertaining to juveniles and closely controlled access to them have been
endorsed by all of the major standards groups and model legislation which have addressed the problem." Id.
at 149.
27 See Douglas R. Rendleman, ParensPatriae:From Chancery to the Juvenile Court, in 3 CRIME AND
JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 119. Revisionist historians see the juvenile court largely not as a benevolent institution, but rather as a tool of behavior control exerted by the middle and upper classes upon lower class
children. Professor Rendlemen acknowledges that there is some truth to this, but also maintains that there is
still value in the original parenspatriaegoals of the juvenile court. See id. See also Lamar T. Empey, The
ProgressiveLegacy and the Concept of Childhood, in JUVENILE JUSTICE: THE PROGRESSIVE LEGACY AND
CURRENT REFORMS 3-33 (Lamar T. Empey ed., 1979).
28 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
29 The typical juvenile justice system had jurisdiction only until the juvenile's 21st birthday. Thus,
custodial sanctions for the most serious crimes would nevertheless end no later than that date, and sometimes sooner. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 26, at 337.
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the determination of a remedy. These disadvantages could include the fact that
juveniles could be brought before juvenile courts for offenses that would not
violate any law if committed by an adult, 3 and also the fact that juveniles were
commonly not accorded the same procedural rights during the adjudicatory
process that adults were required to receive under provisions of state and federal constitutions. 3'
Gault focused on the latter type of disadvantage. Fifteen-year-old Gerald
Gault was adjudicated delinquent for making offensive and indecent telephone
calls32 under Arizona juvenile court procedures that did not provide for such
basic rights as the right to counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses, the privilege against self-incrimination, and other guarantees that
have been recognized as fundamental in adult criminal proceedings.33 The
state of Arizona defended its procedural informality as benefiting the juvenile
defendant, allowing "a fatherly judge" to tailor his benevolent paternal approach to the necessities of the individual case. 4 The Supreme Court, cutting
through the rhetoric of the civil, remedial nature of the juvenile justice system,
held that the reality of the juvenile court process was sufficiently adversary
and its consequences sufficiently punitive to require adherence to at least "the
fundamental requirements of due process."35 While this might not require full
compliance with all procedural rules applied in the prosecution of adults, it
would at least require such things as sufficient notice of the charges,36 the right
to counsel,3 7 a privilege against self-incrimination, and the right to confront and
cross-examine witnesses.3"
To most members of the Court, and probably to most advocates of children's rights, Gault was a clear victory. The Court maintained that its insistence upon formal procedural guarantees during the adjudication process for
juveniles was not incompatible with the humanitarian, rehabilitative aspects of
3 These non-criminal "status offenses" have long been a major part of the juvenile court's jurisdiction.
See Paul Lerman, Delinquency and Social Policy:A HistoricalPerspective, in 3 CRIME AND JUSTICE, supra
note 12, at 23.
31 For an overview of juvenile court procedures on the eve of Gault, see Joel F. Handler, The Juvenile
Court and the Adversary System: Problemsof Functionand Form, 1965 Wis. L. REV. 7.
32 387 U.S. at 4-8. Gault was, at that time, still subject to probation for a prior incident involving the
theft33of a wallet from a woman's purse. See id. at 4.
SeeMi.
at 9-10.

34 Id. at 25-26.
31 id. at 19.
36 Seeid. at31-34.
37 See id.
at 34-42.
31 See id. at 42-57.
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the juvenile justice system. '9Indeed, the Court noted that providing a less arbitrary system might advance rehabilitative goals: "[The appearance as well
as the actuality of fairness, impartiality and orderliness-in short, the essentials
of due process-may be a more impressive and more therapeutic attitude so far
as the juvenile is concemed."' 4 Gault could be seen as giving the juvenile the
best of both worlds: something resembling adult levels of due process protection in the determination of delinquency and the less punitive consequences of
the juvenile system for those found delinquent. 41 In a prescient dissent, however, Justice Stewart saw insistence on strong due process safeguards as the
first step in the rejection of the entire juvenile justice model.42 If states are
compelled "to impose the Court's long catalog of requirements upon juvenile
proceedings, 43 the temptation to revert entirely to the adult model would be
inevitable; Gault would serve to "invite a long step backwards into the nineteenth century." 44
A number of post-Gault decisions moved the protections available in
delinquency proceedings closer to the procedural protections provided to
adults, but the Supreme Court never entirely abandoned the notion that
juvenile justice was unique. Thus trial by jury was held not to be constitutionally required in the juvenile system,45 and pretrial detention of
juveniles based upon the likelihood that the juvenile would commit additional
offenses while awaiting trial was condoned 46 at a time when no authority
existed under federal law for comparable detention of adults. 47 In addition,
even when the Court has held that minors are within the protection of a
39 "T]he observance of due process standards, intelligently and not ruthlessly administered, will not
compel the States to abandon or displace any of the substantive benefits of the juvenile process." Id. at 21.
40 Id. at 26.
41 id. at 22-25.
42 See id. at78-81 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
43 Id. at 79 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
44 Id. In describing that century, Justice Stewart said:
In that era there were no juvenile proceedings, and a child was tried in a conventional criminal
court with all the trappings of a conventional criminal trial. So it was that a 12-year-old boy
named James Guild was tried in New Jersey for killing Catharine Beakes. A jury found him
guilty of murder, and he was sentenced to death by hanging. The sentence was executed. It was
all very constitutional.
Id. at 79-80 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
45 See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
46 See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
47 In 1987, the Supreme Court upheld the Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976
(codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-1351), which now permits courts to consider dangerousness in making decisions concerning pretrial release of adults. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 741 (1987).
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constitutional provision, it has often adopted a different standard than that
applied to adults. For example, while the Fourth Amendment applies in the
public school environment, the standard for determining the scope of a
reasonable search of a student within that environment is less protective than
that applied in most adult contexts.48 In contrast, in applying the Miranda9
restrictions on police interrogation, the Supreme Court has ignored situational
differences between adults and juveniles. The Court has rejected the
contention that a juvenile's request to speak to a trusted adult is equivalent to
an adult's request for a lawyer, which requires the police to cease
interrogation."' Cases such as this suggest a pattern that cannot be encouraging
to advocates of children's rights. The flexibility that Gault permits in the
extension of procedural rights to juveniles can be used to take notice of
relevant differences between adults and adolescents when those differences
lead to narrowing the scope of the right in question, but this flexibility can be
used to ignore such differences when acknowledging them would lead to
expanding the right.
In light of these developments, children's rights advocates unsurprisingly
have continued to call for the expansion of constitutional protection for
children in delinquency proceedings. But once again, these calls raise the
question that Justice Stewart saw as an inevitable consequence of Gault:
Beyond narrow questions of procedure, is the juvenile court approach to
delinquency, particularly its commitment to rehabilitation and its tendency to
mitigate the severity of punishment, something worth preserving? The answer
to this question is by no means clear, whether examined from the standpoint of

48

In New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985), the Court reasoned: "Although the underlying com-

mand of the Fourth Amendment is always that searches and seizures be reasonable, what is reasonable depends on the context within which a search takes place." Id. at 337. The Court further held:

Mhe

accommodation of the privacy interests of schoolchildren with the substantial need of
teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the schools does not require strict
adherence to the requirement that searches be based on probable cause to believe that the subject
of the search has violated or is violating the law.
Id. at 341.
49 In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Court held that a suspect in custody must be told of
the right to remain silent, the right to consult an attorney, the right to have an attorney present during questioning, and the right to have an attorney appointed if the suspect cannot afford one.
St See Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979) (holding request to talk to juvenile's parole officer not
equivalent to request to speak with an attorney); United States ex reL Riley v. Franzen, 653 F.2d 1153 (7th
Cir. 1981) (finding request to talk to parent not equivalent to request to speak with an attorney). But see
People v. Castro, 462 N.Y.S.2d 369 (Sup. Ct. 1983) (holding request to speak with parent equivalent to request for an attorney).
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the juvenile or the community as a whole. Certainly most minors convicted of
crimes would prefer shorter periods of confinement, and confinement in
humane institutions with less emphasis on pure punishment and more on
rehabilitation. With respect to the length of confinement, the indeterminacy of
juvenile sentencing stands in sharp contrast to the clear trend in adult
corrections toward more determinate sentencing.5 ' But, in light of the fact that
juvenile confinement typically must end at age eighteen or twenty-one, 52 this
leads to mixed results. In some cases, juveniles will be detained for longer
periods than adult offenders for similar offenses-in other cases (typically
involving the most serious crimes) for much shorter sentences." Much has
been written in support of the contention that, despite the rhetoric of
rehabilitation, juvenile facilities are in practice no more humane than adult
facilities.m Still, it would be difficult to argue that the adult correctional
system is a more humane alternative. Thus, despite its shortcomings and its
failure to fulfill the rehabilitative goals that inspired its creation, the juvenile
court system is generally defended by children's rights advocates, at least as
against the alternative of referring juveniles to the adult criminal system.
From the standpoint of the community at large, the relative merits of a
separate juvenile justice system seem even less convincing. Juvenile crime,
particularly violent crime, rose dramatically from the mid-1980s to the mid1990s." Most social science research has been skeptical of the rehabilitative
51 See TAMASAK WICHARAYA, SIMPLETHEoRY, HARD REALITY: THE IMPACt OF SENTENCING REFORMS
ON COURTS, PRISONS AND CRIME 31-63 (1995).
52 See supra note 29.
53 The indetermninance of juvenile sentencing could mean that someone such as Gerald Gault could

serve a sentence of several years for what would be a misdemeanor for an adult. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,
8-9 (1967). Conversely, ajuvenile who committed an offense for which an adult could receive more than 20
years imprisonment would receive only a few years of custodial detention. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 26,at 336-39.
54 See Steven Schlossman, Delinquent Children:The Juvenile Reform School, in THE OXFORD HISTORY
OF THE PRISON, supra note 16, at 363-89. Schlossman traces the attempts over the years, occasionally successful, to create a genuinely rehabilitative model for juvenile institutions, but concludes that, on the whole,
"[t]he rehabilitative ideal was virtually denied, for children as well as adults, as a legitimate or feasible purpose of corrections." Id. at 384. Rehabilitative goals continue to be pursued to some extent in noninstitutional treatment programs, but the reform school itself is merely a "mini-prison" for children. Id. at
383-87.
55 In 1985, just over 1.7 million arrests were made of those under age 18; just over 70,000 were for
violent crimes. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES

1985: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 174 (1986). In 1995, slightly over 2 million arrests were made of those
under age 18, and arrests of juveniles for violent crime had increased more sharply, to just over 115,000.
See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 1995: UNIFORM
CRIME REPORTS 224 (1996).
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effect of the juvenile justice system. 6 Of course, this falls short of establishing
that subjecting juveniles to the adult correctional system would have produced
better results. Nevertheless, the last decade has seen a clear trend toward, if
not abolishing the separate juvenile court system, at least seriously curtailing
its jurisdiction.
In the last decade, a large majority of states have enacted provisions that
make it easier to subject juveniles to the jurisdiction of adult criminal courts.
States have either completely removed juvenile court jurisdiction over certain
classes of cases, based upon the age of the adolescent, the gravity of the crime,
or both," or created presumptions in favor of referring individual cases out of
juvenile court, reversing prior presumptions in favor of juvenile jurisdiction.
On the federal level, Congress has moved not only to expand the prosecution
of adolescents as adults in federal court, but also to condition federal grants on
a state's willingness to try violent adolescents as adults.6 In light of the longstanding acceptance of the separate juvenile justice system, the strength and
swiftness of this counterreform has been remarkable. Defenders of the juvenile justice system have been largely ineffectual in defending its jurisdiction.
At first glance, this might be explained as a purely utilitarian result, a consequence of the public's frustration with perceived and actual increases in the
incidence of juvenile crime. But that explanation may be too simple. A more
interesting explanation may become evident when we examine the recent revival of retributionism as a basis for criminal justice, and how it intersects with
the legal system's increased willingness to regard adolescents as autonomous
rights-bearing individuals.

56 See RICHARD J. LUNDMAN,

PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY

(1984).

Lundman's review of social science evidence indicates that institutionalization may reduce the incidence of
juvenile crime, but through simple incapacitation or deterrence, rather than rehabilitation. See id. at 187214. He also finds, however, that at least for many juveniles, community-based treatment programs are as
effective as institutionalization in reducing recidivism. See id. at 156-82. Evidence on the effect of "scared
straight" programs is mixed. See id. at 150-52. The clear trend toward increasing the population of juvenile
detention centers seems to indicate a movement toward theories of deterrence, retribution, or incapacitation
rather than rehabilitation. See Ira M. Schwartz & Deborah A. Willis, National Trends in Juvenile Detention,
in REFORMiNG JUVENILE DETENTION 13 (Ira M. Schwartz & William H. Barton eds., 1994).
57 See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Youth Crime-and What Not To Do About It, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 435,
438 (1997).
58 See id.
'9 See id.
60 See id.at438-39.
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II. PATERNALISM, AUTONOMY, AND INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY
IN JUVENILE JUSTICE

The approach that a society takes toward issues involving juvenile justice
will likely be related to more general attitudes toward the entire subject of
criminal justice. The standard list of purposes of a criminal justice system includes incapacitation of the offender, deterrence of others, rehabilitation of the
offender, and satisfying the community's need for retribution. 6' The type and
severity of punishment that society favors will vary depending on the relative
weight given to each of these purposes. And if society is to react in substantially different ways to different categories of crimes or criminals, those different approaches will likely be justified by presumed differences in the effectiveness of adopting various approaches in achieving one or more of those
goals.
As we have seen, the classic rationale for a separate juvenile justice system
has primarily focused on rehabilitation. 62 The young, and therefore young
criminals, are thought to be more malleable, less fixed on a life of crime, and
therefore the expense and effort called for by a rehabilitative approach is
thought likely to be effective, at least more so than in the case of adult criminals. 63 As a goal for the overall criminal justice system, rehabilitation has been
in decline for some time." One might, then, explain the recent shift in attitudes
regarding juvenile justice by noting the overall loss of faith in rehabilitation,
and arguing that it has become strong enough to finally invade the one area of
criminal law where rehabilitation had continued to command respect. While
this is certainly plausible, this Article maintains that something more complex
is also going on.

61 See generally NIGEL WALKER, WHY PUNISH? (1991).
62 See TEETERS &REINEMANN, supra note 23, at 277-90.
63 See Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104 (1909). Judge Mack's article is the
classic early statement and defense of the concept of a separate, rehabilitative juvenile court system.
6
As Norval Morris has stated:
'Rehabilitation,' whatever it means and whatever the programs that allegedly give it meaning,
must cease to be the purpose of the prison sanction. This does not mean that the various developed treatment programs within prisons need to be abandoned; quite the contrary, they need expansion. But it does mean that they must not be seen as purposive in the sense that criminals are
to be sent to prison for treatment. There is a sharp distinction between the purposes of incarceration and opportunities for the training and assistance of prisoners that may be pursued within
those purposes.
MORRIs, supranote 20, at 14.
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Considering the differences between the juvenile and adult legal systems in
light of the goal of incapacitation will contribute little to our understanding. It
seems clear that the extent to which a punishment incapacitates bears little relation to the age of the criminal. The efficacy of various approaches to punishment in fulfilling the goal of incapacitation has never been advanced as a
justification for a separate juvenile justice system. In every case, more severe
punishment (i.e., longer periods of detention) leads to more incapacitation.
Debate and disagreement over the appropriate approach to juvenile crime will
clearly turn on other considerations.
In recent decades, general deterrence has probably been the most frequently discussed rationale for justifying a system of criminal sanctions.6 It
seems unlikely, however, that examining deterrence will provide us with the
key to understanding the change in public attitudes toward juvenile justice.
The juvenile justice system was not created because of a belief that a system of
less harsh penalties would prove to be more of a deterrent to juvenile crime. It
is also unlikely that general deterrence was any less powerful a consideration
in past decades than it is now. If deterrence is more prominent as a goal to be
pursued by the juvenile justice system, it is probably due less to any change in
the absolute value that society places on deterrence, and more to the previously
discussed loss of faith in rehabilitation.
Finally, we turn to retribution. For some time, retribution, thought of as
essentially indistinguishable from revenge, was not only subordinated to
deterrence and rehabilitation in the minds of most commentators, but was
regarded as highly suspect, perhaps entirely illegitimate, as a rationale for
criminal punishment." But in recent years, retribution has undergone
something of a revival. To some extent, this can be attributed to the realization
that deterrence alone, even where its efficacy can be demonstrated, cannot
satisfactorily serve to justify punishment. This is strikingly illustrated by the
hypothetical situation where the state has the opportunity to punish one who is
innocent of the crime charged, but whom the community believes, or can be
65 See generally ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 5. The philosophical justification of deterrence as
the principal, if not the only, proper justification for the infliction of punishment is generally regarded as
flowing from Bentham and the utilitarians of the early nineteenth century. See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 156-73 (J.H. Bums & H.L.A. Hart eds.,

Clarendon Press 1996) (1789).
66 Thus, in his concurring opinion in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), which invalidated the
then prevalent forms of death penalty statutes, Justice Thurgood Marshall not only rejected the legitimacy of
retribution as a goal of criminal justice, but stated that in contemporary America, "no one has ever seriously
advanced retribution as a legitimate goal." Id. at 363.
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led to believe, is guilty. In such a case, punishment might well serve as a
deterrent to others, but regardless, few would find such a practice tolerable.
Similarly, because more severe punishments can be expected to always deter
more effectively than lesser sanctions, deterrence alone cannot explain why all
crimes are not punished with equal harshness. Legal history gives us an
example of a time when this was largely the case; as late as the eighteenth
century, a remarkably wide range of crimes, including some that barely rise to
the level of a felony today, were punishable by death. 67 This severe and singleminded pursuit of the goal of deterrence we now regard as intolerable;
proportionality of punishment to the crime is considered a constitutional
requirement.6s While deterrence surely is an important goal of the criminal
justice system, it must at least share the stage with other considerations.
The most prominent of these additional considerations, of course, is a sense
of fairness or justice. Punishment must not be merely efficacious; it must be
deserved. Modem defenders of the notion of retribution point to this crucial
idea to distinguish retribution from mere revenge. 69 Revenge calls forth images of unthinking, reflexive, perhaps unlimited payback for harm done. 70
Even if limited by some sense of proportionality, revenge focuses overwhelmingly, perhaps exclusively, on the damage done by the criminal, rather
7
than the level of guilt or personal responsibility underlying the criminal act. '
A more sophisticated retributionism takes account not only of the act
committed, but also the extent to which the actor was fully responsible for his
actions. To what extent did the actor have criminal intent, actual control over
his actions, and appreciation of the consequences? 72 This more sophisticated

67 For a list of dozens of crimes, in addition to murder, that were punishable by death, see the excerpt

from P. Colquhoun (1800) reprintedin I BASIL MONTAGU, THE OPINIONS OF DIFFERENT AUTHORS UPON THE
PUNISHMENT OF DEATH 80-83 (1809).

68 See Edmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (holding death penalty may not be imposed upon par-

ticipant in felony who neither killed nor intended that anyone be killed); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584
(1977) (holding death penalty may not be imposed upon rapist who neither killed nor attempted to kill). But
see Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987) (holding felon who displays "reckless indifference to human life"
may warrant death penalty).
69 See HENBERO, supranote 7, at 17-29.
70 "Retribution is a measured return of evil according to some notion of what an agent (or group) is

perceived to deserve. Revenge, on the other hand, is an unmeasured return of evil that may or may not connect to desert." Id. at 18.
71 Vengeance, then, is generally associated with passion; a sophisticated retributionism can be defended on rational grounds. See id. at 158-64.
72 See BODENHtMER, supra note 7, at 31. "Ihe recognition of responsibility does not mean that human
Any
beings are held responsible by the law for every objectively unlawful act which they commit. ...
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retributionism, while more easily defensible, is also much more difficult to implement. Beyond a narrow range of obviously deranged or otherwise incompetent individuals (including, of course, very small children), who can be said
to be less than fully responsible for their actions and to what degree?
One approach to this dilemma is to work from a strong presumption that all
are fully responsible for their acts, and to exempt only the most obvious and
extreme cases of incompetence. This was the law's dominant approach prior
to the twentieth century; aside from children under the age of seven, some but
not all children between seven and fourteen, 7 and those found insane under the
strict standard that become known as the McNaughton rule, 74 few were regarded as less than fully responsible.
But during the twentieth century, medicine and social science recognized
and publicized ways in which individuals were less fully in control of their acts
than previously imagined. 7" Inevitably, the criminal law would have to take
account of such developments. During the middle decades of the century,
more liberal definitions of the insanity defense and related notions mitigating
individual criminal responsibility gained support. 76
In recent years, however, there has been a negative reaction to this increased willingness to mitigate punishment because of a perceived social or
biological influence that made an offender less than fully responsible. While
perhaps not returning fully to common law standards, the current trend is
clearly in the direction of treating most people (at least most adults) as fully
responsible, and therefore fully culpable, for their criminal acts. To some,

system of law resting on the notion of responsibility will draw a distinction between voluntary and
involuntary acts of wrongdoing." Id.
73 See supranotes 11-15 and accompanying text.
74 See Daniel McNaughton's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). This case established a rigorous test for a
defendant to meet in order to sustain a defense of insanity. The accused had to establish that he either was
not conscious of the nature of the act he was committing, or that he could not appreciate that it was considered wrongful.
75 The American Law Institute, in its Model Penal Code, advocates expansion of the traditional test to
include a defendant who "as a result of mental disease or defect ...lacks substantial capacity... to conform
his conduct to the requirements of law." MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Final Draft 1962). Such a test
"acknowledges that volitional as well as cognitive impairments" may relieve one of criminal responsibility.
State v. Johnson, 399 A.2d 469,476 (R.I. 1974).
76 See Heathcote W. Wales, The Rise, the Fall, and the Resurrection of the Medical Model, 63 GEo.
L.J. 87 (1974).
77 The acquittal of John Hinckley, by reason of insanity, in his 1982 trial for the attempted
assassination of Ronald Reagan, created a significant backlash against invocation of the insanity defense.
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this trend appears to be a move away from a criminal justice system primarily
concerned with deterrence and toward one based upon retribution. Deterrence,
with its overtones of rational calculation, is seen as compatible with medical or
social science theories that argue for the mitigation of guilt. However, the increasing rejection of mitigating defenses can just as easily be seen as prompted
by a concern for deterrence that overpowers the fairness concerns that must
exist in any defensible, sophisticated retributive system.
After decades of analyzing the extent to which we freely choose our actions and the extent to which they are determined for us by biology or social
influence, perhaps the best we can do is to state that the overwhelming majority of human acts result from some combination of choice based upon more or
less rational calculation and predispositions beyond individual control.7s The
criminal justice system, and perhaps society as a whole, has little, if any, control over those predispositions. Nevertheless, the system does have some degree of control over the outcome of a potential criminal's rational calculation.
While neither the measurement of the efficacy of deterrence nor the measurement of the degree of individual responsibility is an exact science, deterrence
can at least appear to be reflected in a decrease in crime rates. Its failure, conversely, might be indicated by their increase. 79 A focus on deterrence, then,
gives us some sense of control over events, regardless of the difficulty of reliably assessing cause and effect.
A focus on the individual responsibility of a criminal for his actions, apart
from deterrence, as the basis for punishment, provides us with neither this
sense of control nor any real standard for establishing the validity of our individual assessments. As growing bodies of knowledge in the fields of biology
and psychology suggest a more prominent role for predispositions and a lesser
role for free choices, the entire enterprise of criminal punishment becomes less
defensible. Understandably, then, deterrence, with its focus on influencing
See RICHARD G. SINGER & MARTIN R. GARDNER, CRINES AND PUNiSHmENT:. CASES, MATERIALS AND
READINGS IN CRIMINAL LAW 831-33 (1996).

78 Thus Sanford Kadish has written:

Social deprivation may well establish a credible explanation of how the defendant has come to
have the character he has. But it does not establish a moral excuse any more than a legal one, for
there is a difference between explaining a person's wrongful behavior and explaining it away ...
Otherwise, there would be no basis for moral responsibility.
Sanford H. Kadish, Excusing Crime, 75 CAL. L. REv. 257, 284 (1987). See also Hyman Gross, Some Unacceptable Excuses, 19 WAYNE L. REV. 997 (1973).
79 Thus, the debate over the death penalty focuses to a great extent on the presence or absence of hard
evidence of deterrence. See supranotes 5-6.
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future behavior, however imperfectly, will seem to many to be a far better basis for constructing a criminal justice system.
Still, the central importance of the concepts of individual responsibility and
degrees of guilt can hardly be denied. While the public takes pleasure in the
recent reports of falling crime rates, questions of individual degrees of guilt
remain prominent. The recent backlash in public opinion against ready acceptance of excuses that seek to diminish individual responsibility ' would
seem to be primarily a rejection of the notion that free choice is not a prominent factor in criminal behavior as an empirical proposition, rather than a rejection of the notion that criminal punishment is justified insofar as it responds
to a criminal's freely chosen antisocial act.
In earlier decades, retribution, seen simply as the vindication of an
irrational urge for vengeance, could readily be dismissed in favor of the
apparently rational and scientific approaches of deterrence and rehabilitation."'
But faith in science has peaked; it may well be waning." Therefore, the
recasting of retribution as being grounded, not merely in the victim's or the
community's need for revenge, but rather in the notion that a free choice to do
harm must include a willingness to accept the negative consequences of
punishment, makes retribution consistent with trends in the law that recognize
and defer to individual autonomy to a greater degree than ever. In a wide
range of contexts, including reproductive rights,"3 medical care, the control of
one's own death,84 speech and other First Amendment concerns," claims that
personal choice must be respected have proliferated. Opponents of these
claims of autonomy often argue that the individuals involved are causing
themselves, as well as others, harm, that their choices are not sufficiently well80 See supra note 77.
81 See supranote 66.
82 Thus, we have seen broad attacks on the law's use of "junk science." See, e.g., PETER W. HUBER,
GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1991). See also ALAN DERSHOWITZ, THE ABUSE

ExcusE (1994); ELIZABETH F. LoFrus & KATHERINE KETCHAM, THE MYTH OF REPRESSED MEMORY (1994)
(criticizing application of science in context of recovery of repressed memory).
83 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (further defining right to abortion); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (discussing abortion rights); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(protecting right of access to birth control devices).
84 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (rejecting constitutional right to assisted suicide); Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (finding right to refuse medical treatment).
85 See, e.g., Reno v. A.C.L.U., 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (striking down prohibitions on "indecent" interet
speech); 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (expanding protection of commercial speech);
R.A.V. v. SL Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (limiting prosecution of "hate speech").
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informed or free, and that therefore, society need not respect these choices.
Defenders of autonomy will respond by downplaying the extent to which
individuals choose to act as the result of external constraints."' As a result, any
attempt to justify interference with individual autonomy in order to save the
individual from the negative consequences of his or her own acts will be
described as impermissibly paternalistic." Much has been written recently on
the question of whether respect for the model of the autonomous individual has
become too dominant in legal culture,89 but normative assessments aside, it can
hardly be denied that the value society places upon individual autonomy has
grown substantially. In recent decades, an increased level of respect for
autonomous individual choices has generally been associated with liberal
politics. This is no doubt due to the extent to which the contested matters
involving these choices have assessed claims running contrary to long-standing
moral norms, perhaps most prominently in matters involving sexual and
reproductive behaviors.?o However, political conservatives have also eagerly
embraced the language of respect for autonomous choices in matters such as
economic and property rights?' and parental control over the education and
discipline of children.9 Both the libertarian and anti-libertarian strain can be
found in the camps of self-described liberals and of conservatives. Of course,
while there are consistent libertarians and consistent anti-libertarians, a large
86 This argument is quite prominent in cases involving the "right to die." See, e.g., Yale Kamisar,
When Is There a Constitutional"Right to Die"? When Is There No Constitutional "Right To Live"?, 25 GA.
L. REV. 1203 (1991).
87 The response to arguments such as Professor Kamisar's is to focus on assisted suicide as a matter of
"patient empowerment." Robert A. Sedler, ConstitutionalChallenges to Bans On "Assisted Suicide": The
View From Without and Within, 21 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 777, 781 (1994).
88 See generally ROLF SARTORIus, PATERNALISM (Rolf E. Sartorius ed., 1983). Most of the contributors to this collection are generally critical of paternalistic policies.
89 See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITIcAL DIscouRsE

(1991). Glendon stated:
As various new rights are proclaimed or proposed, the catalog of individual liberties expands
without much consideration of the ends to which they are oriented, their relationship to one another, to corresponding responsibilities, or to the general welfare.... Saturated with rights, political language can no longer perform the important function of facilitating public discussion of
the right ordering of our lives together.
Id. at xi.
9o See supra note 83.
91 See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (requiring reasonable relationship between
legitimate governmental interests and permit condition); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003 (1992) (strengthening property rights against governmental "takings" by regulation).
92 See generally Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce and the
Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995 (1992) (tracing history of right of parental control and
criticizing use of concept of individual rights to justify control of one person over another).
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number of people, perhaps a majority, find themselves more or less respectful
of autonomous individual choices on different issues. 93 How should one's
attitudes toward individual autonomy affect one's position on the nature of
criminal punishment?
Whether accurate or not, the stereotypical liberal position in contemporary
American politics combines a heightened respect for individual autonomy on a
broad range of social issues with positions on criminal justice that not only favor greater procedural protections for the accused, but more important for our
purposes, a greater willingness to mitigate punishment. This is either because
of a rejection of retributionist goals in favor of rehabilitation or deterrence, or
because of a belief that much crime is the consequence not of reasoned antisocial choice, but rather of influences largely beyond the control of the criminal.
At the other end of the political spectrum, the stereotypical conservative simply reverses these positions. To the conservative, individual choice is not to be
respected where it conflicts with long-standing social norms. Punishment for
crime should be severe, either because severe consequences must follow the
antisocial choices made by the criminal, or because future criminals must be
deterred. Criminal transgressions will be deterred by rational awareness of the
dire consequences that await criminals if they are apprehended. Is either set of
positions entirely consistent?
If the approach taken by either the liberal or conservative is merely consequentialist, then these positions may surely be seen as consistent. The conservative values both a low incidence of youth crime and a strict adherence to traditional morality, and chooses a set of positions designed to bring about both
ends. The liberal, also valuing low crime rates, but disagreeing about the effectiveness of severe punishment in bringing them about, and placing less of a
value on enforcing traditional morality, will choose a different set of policies.
But if either of these sets of positions is evaluated from a perspective of retributive, rather than consequentialist, justice, significant problems emerge.
The classic philosophical defense of retributionism was set forth by
Immanuel Kant,"4 who maintained that a punishment that closely mirrored the
crime itself (i.e., the death penalty for murder) was required in order to actually

93 An intellectual movement attempting to position itself somewhere between libertarianism and majoritarianism has arisen in recent years, styling itself as "communitarian." See generally AMITAI ErzIONI:
THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES AND THE COMMUNITARIAN AGENDA (1993).

94 See IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OFLAW 196 (W. Hastie trans., 1887).
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respect the criminal and his own moral choice to commit the crime.95 By
committing the crime, the criminal declares by his actions that he has chosen a
moral universe in which such an act is permitted. Logically, the act must be
permitted to others, not merely to.him. When society exacts the same toll
against the criminal that he has already taken against another, it is merely
respecting his 96choice to create his own moral regime and to live with its
consequences.
Under this theory, to refuse to punish or even to unduly mitigate punishment becomes less an act of disregard for the victim of the crime than a mark
of disrespect for the criminal. To mitigate punishment, or to choose a course
of non-punitive rehabilitation, is to engage in a form of paternalism, a term that
has become something of an epithet in a society more and more committed to
autonomy. Respecting individual choice, in this view, necessarily means respecting the choice to live with the consequences of an act. Mitigating the
consequences demeans the individual's choice; it says, in effect, that the
criminal did not realize what he was doing.
While this view of retributive justice is most obviously relevant in matters
involving criminal law, it resonates elsewhere in the legal system as well. A
striking and obvious example is the recent history of tort litigation involving
tobacco companiesY The long string of courtroom victories for cigarette
manufacturers in lawsuits brought by smokers or their estates can largely be
attributed to the strength of the companies' argument that the smokers voluntarily chose to smoke and assumed the consequences of doing so.99 Even
though this defense is maddeningly inconsistent with the simultaneous industry
assertion that the dangers of smoking are unproven and merely speculative,'t m
the argument that the "autonomous choices" of the individual smokers should
be "respected" seemed to strike a chord with juries. It was only when the

95 See id.
9' See id.
97 See supra note 88.
9R See Robert L. Rabin, A SociolegalHistory of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 STAN. L. REv. 853
(1992).
9 "mhe most salient theme in [recent tobacco] litigation has been freedom of choice.... Mobacco
litigation is a last vestige of a perhaps idealized vision of nineteenth century tort law as an interpersonal morality play." Id. at 870-71.
1o)Professor Rabin points out that the tobacco companies' argument that causation had not been established has never been convincing to juries, but its persistence has "worked to [the industry's] advantage
principally by imposing an enormous cost burden on its adversaries in waging a battle of the experts." Id. at
860.
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plaintiffs became individuals or entities that did not themselves choose to
smoke, but were nevertheless
harmed
.+
+
.
•
101 by smoking by others, that the tide
turned against the tobacco companies.
If one assumes the position, with respect to criminal law, that an individual
decision to commit a crime must be "respected" by subjecting the criminal to
the negative consequences of his acts, rigorous retributionism becomes a matter of respect for individual autonomy. One would expect that this would lead
to analogous positions in other areas of the law, such as support of the defense
of assumption of'risk. In matters of individual rights involving autonomous
choices, it should lead, then, to respect for such choices, at least to the extent
of refusing to veto them on the paternalistic grounds that the individual is incapable of making these choices or should be spared the consequences of those
choices.
To be sure, there are a number of serious flaws in this view of autonomy.
Even if we put aside controversial matters such as genetic predispositions or
predispositions ingrained as a consequence of early experience,"" individuals
act within a web of social influences for a variety of motives that make the
model of•+..the rational
•
103 individual coolly maximizing his own welfare an obvious
oversimplification. Even to the extent that the individual seeks to act that
way, problems of limited knowledge, as well as attempts of others to persuade
by supplying misleading information, loom large." Again, the example provided by cigarette smokers is instructive. When a neophyte chooses to smoke,
he does so in the face of the tobacco companies' insistence that the overwhelming scientific consensus concerning the potential dangers is false. At
10l This explains the success of state attorneys general in securing settlements from tobacco companies
in lawsuits brought to reimburse public coffers for the cost of treating tobacco-related illness. See Mark
Curriden, A Texas Turnaround. Fear of Disclosures and Sky-High Verdicts May Be Prompting Big Tobacco's Sudden Rush to Settle, 84 A.B.A. J. 24 (1998).
1u2 "mo deny that biological aberrations and dysfunctions exert some influence on an individual's decisions and actions in certain environments would be to dispute scientific reality." Maureen P. Coffey, Note,
The Genetic Defense: Excuse or Explanation, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 353, 395 (1993); see also David L.
B azelon, The Morality of the CriminalLaw, 49 S. CAL L. REV. 385 (1976).
13 See generally Richard Delgado, "Rotten Social Background":Should the CriminalLaw Recognize a
Defense of Severe EnvironmentalDeprivation?. 3 LAw & INEQ. J. 9 (1985). Of course, to recognize the effect of social influence is not necessarily to excuse the individual's behavior. See Kadish, supra note 78.
The issue of autonomy, of course, arises apart from the issue of criminal responsibility. See Donald L.
Beschle, Autonomous Decisionmaking and Social Choice: Examining the "Right to Die", 77 KY. L. 319
(1988-89).
114 A prime example is the effort of the tobacco industry to rebut evidence linking smoking with disease. See RONALD J. TROXER & GERALD E. MARKLE, CIGARETrEs: THE BATrLE OVER SMOKING 91-106
(1983).
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the same time, image advertising promotes the product by sending largely nonrational messages about the social desirability of cigarettes.' 5 After the
smoker has begun the habit, the decision of whether to continue or quit must
be made against the background of the addictive qualities of nicotine." 6
This Article will not attempt to resolve, or even to further the debate over
the validity of the model of the rational autonomous individual, as opposed to
the socially constrained and often non-rational actor, as a preferred basis for
legal decision-making. Much has been said on this topic, and no doubt more
will be said in the future. What is important is to point out the contrasting positions. One may be committed to a strong defense of the autonomy of the individual. Autonomous choices, generally reflections of rational choice and individual values not subject to social second-guessing, should be respected.
This leads to the conclusion, it would seem, that the individual should live with
(perhaps is even entitled to live with) the consequences of those choices and
values, whether those consequences are beneficial or harmful. On the other
hand, one may be deeply skeptical of the model of rational autonomous choice.
Individual choice is often the product of social influence, lack of accurate information, or the inability, for some reason, to rationally process information
and decide on a course of action. Thus, individual choices should not receive
automatic deference. When they are overridden, it is not always merely to advance the good of others. Sometimes, in short, paternalism is justified. This
will mean that we are justified in mitigating the negative consequences of an
individual's acts, including acts that are criminal, in recognition of the extent
to which the individual is not fully responsible.
Of course, one may be generally committed to the model of the autonomous individual, yet make exceptions for individuals or categories of individuals whose choices seem in some way to fall short of the model of the rational
decision-maker. Thus, coerced choices, or those choices made by the mentally
ill, may not be respected.'m In deciding whether to respect the choices of an
individual or a category of individuals, we should feel a need to be consistent
with respect to that individual or category. In other words, if we feel obligated

1()5The "Marlboro Country" campaign, one of the most successful in advertising history, used nonrational imagery to create a dominant brand at the very time that the health effects of smoking were becoming widely known. See RICHARD KLUGER, ASHES TO ASHES 292-97 (1996).

t0

See id. at 740-47.

Wertheimer discusses exploitation in a
number of contexts and notes that even libertarian thinkers will classify relationships as exploitative if
someone "is coerced, is defrauded, or cannot reason effectively." Id. at 13.
1(ft See generally ALAN NVERTHEIMER, EXPLOITATION (1996).
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to refrain from paternalism with respect to one of the individual's choices, we
should at least feel dissonance if we act paternalistically with respect to another choice by that same person.
The law has always regarded infancy as one of the conditions justifying an
exception to the general principle of individual responsibility. " " Such an exception may justify a paternalism that shields a child from full responsibility
for the harm he has caused others, or a paternalism that frustrates the child's
choice to engage in activity that is permitted for adults. But when is this paternalism justified? If it is clearly justified with respect to a five-year-old, is it
also justified with respect to a fifteen-year-old? And if paternalism toward a
fifteen-year-old is justified with respect to some decisions, such as those involving criminal responsibility, must it also be justified in other contexts? Before surveying what social science can tell us about the relative abilities of
teenagers and adults to make significant life decisions, it will be helpful to examine the ways in which the law has come to treat the ability of teenagers to
make these decisions in areas outside of the criminal law context.
H. AUTONOMY, PATERNALISM, AND TEENAGERS: TRENDS OUTSIDE OF
CRIMINAL LAW

How competent are minors to make significant decisions concerning their
own lives? To what extent may the state intervene to limit the choices made
by adolescents on the grounds that teenagers are to some extent incapable of
making choices that may have grave consequences for both themselves and
others? After an adolescent makes an unfortunate choice, to what extent can
and should the state intervene to protect him or her from the consequences of
that ill-advised decision? These questions have been raised in a wide variety
of legal contexts. Very often, however, discussions of these questions limit
themselves to one narrow field, either a specific matter before a court or the
particular area of interest to a commentator. To put walls between different
areas of the law obscures the obvious connection between them.
If the position of the criminal law toward juvenile offenders in the early
twentieth century can be described as paternalistic, and as one that in theory
took the position that teenagers should not be regarded as fully responsible for
their actions and their consequences, it was hardly inconsistent with the law's
approach to minors in other areas. In almost all states, minors could freely
118 See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
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The theory, of course, was that the child's
disaffirm their contracts."'
inexperience made him an easy mark for unscrupulous adults."0 Tort law
imposed upon minors a standard of care that was less than that expected of
adults;' again, the rationale was that age and inexperience would at least
partially interfere with minors' ability to foresee the potential consequences of
their acts." 2 Minors, including those as old as nineteen and twenty, were not
permitted to vote."' Once again, the notion that age brought the maturity
necessary to make these significant decisions held sway.
The parent, not the minor, was the source of decisions regarding medical
care. A child could not consent to medical treatment against the wishes of a
parent,"4 and conversely, the minor could not veto a parental decision in favor
of such treatment."5 When statutes limiting child labor were proposed and
adopted, they were justified in part by the child's inability to weigh the longterm relative benefits of full-time work during the early teenage years on the
one hand and formal education on the other."6 When judges decided to strike
down these statutes on grounds of interference with personal liberty, it was
often the liberty of parents to choose how best to further the interests of the
family, rather than the liberty of the child to make autonomous decisions, that

109See ARTHUR L.CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 227 (1952).
10 Even where there was no fraudulent manipulation, "a child may show poor judgment in making a
particular contract, and it is protection against his own ignorance and immaturity-not merely the advantage-taking of others-that the law affords." Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalismand the Law of Contracts,
92 YALE LJ.763,789 (1983).
III See REsTATEMENT(SEcOND) oFTORTS § 283A (1965).
112 See generally Oscar S. Gray, The Standardof Carefor Children Revisited,45 Mo. L. REV. 597, 60102 (1980).
113 In Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), the Court invalidated a congressional attempt to use its
Fourteenth Amendment powers to require states to extend the vote to those age 18 and above in state elections, but upheld federal power to extend the vote in federal elections. In 1971, the Twenty-Sixth Amendment was adopted, providing that voting rights shall not be denied to any citizen age 18 or older. U.S.
CONST. amend. XXVI.
114 See, e.g., Zoski v. Gaines, 260 N.W. 99 (Mich. 1935) (finding assault where surgery was performed
without parental consent); Moss v. Rishworth, 222 S.W. 225 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1920) (same).
115 In Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979), the Court imposed only minimal due process requirements
where parents sought to commit children to state operated mental health facilities. The Court noted the parents' duty "to recognize symptoms of illness and to seek and follow medical advice. The law's concept of
the family rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life's difficult decisions." Id. at 602.
116 See LAWRENCE KOTIN & WILLIAM AIKMAN,

LEGAL FOUNDATIONS

OF COMPULSORY SCHOOL

ATTENDANCE 43-49 (1980). For a modem presentation of the same type of argument, that is, that teenagers
will make unwise trade-offs between income derived from dead-end jobs and education, see Andrea Giampetro-Meyer & Timothy S. Brown, S.J., ProtectingSociety From Teenage Greed: A ProposalFor Revising
the Ages, Hours and Nature of ChildLabor in America, 25 AKRON L. REv. 547 (1992).
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was paramount.' 7 The child's voice was largely unheard in custody disputes.
The common law rule of paternal right to custody was succeeded by the
"tender years" presumption in favor of maternal custody," 8 but neither left
much room for the child's preference. Curfews, minimum drinking ages," 9
and other restrictions"D were fairly consistent in their portrayal of minors, even
relatively mature minors, as incapable of making important decisions and accepting their consequences. Counterexamples are few-perhaps only the usually low marriage age is prominent.'2' Even here, the age of consent to marriage was initially framed in a world in which marriages were largely the
product of parental choice, rather than the choice of the young couple.'22 Efforts to raise the age for consent to marriage, while not universally accepted,
evidence the general attitude of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, among progressives as well as conservatives,'2s that minors were usually
incapable of making significant life choices.
William Blackstone, in discussing the relationship of the father' 24 and child
at English common law, pointed to the connection between the power given to
parents and the correlative duty they had to protect the child from, among
other things, the child's own foolish, immature choices:

117 See Woodhouse, supra note 92, at 1059-68.

118 See generally Jay Einhom, Child Custody in Historical Perspective: A Study of Changing Social
PerceptionsofDivorce and Child Custody in AngloAmerican Law, 4 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 119 (1986).
119 For most of the twentieth century, most states prohibited the purchase of alcohol by those under age
21. During the 1970s, most states reduced their minimum drinking ages, but in the last 20 years, states, acting under pressure from the federal government, have restored the minimum age of 21. See Michael P. Rosenthal, The Minimum Drinking Age for Young People: An Observation, 92 DICK. L. REv. 649, 649-56
(1988).
12( A child's decision to run away from home, to avoid school (truancy), or to defy parental control in
other ways can lead to intervention by juvenile and family courts. See generally R. Hale Andrews, Jr. &
Andrew H. Cohn, Note, Ungovernability: The UnjustifiableJurisdiction,83 YALE L.J. 1383 (1974).
121 At common law, "[a]bove the ages of fourteen [for boys] and twelve [for girls] children could contract valid marriages." HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS INTHE UNITED STATES 88
(1988). Of course, this did not mean that marriages by young teenagers were common. Lawrence Stone
found that in common-law England, late marriage was the norm. LAWRENCE STONE, THE FAMILY, SEX AND
MARRIAGE 37-51 (abridged ed., 1979).
122 Parental control over choice of marriage partners remained strong until the nineteenth century. See
STONE, supra note 121, at 127-36.
123 The twentieth century norm in the United States is a legal marriage age of 18 or 21. See CLARK,
supra note 121, at 89-90. Clark points out that the fluctuations in the legal age for consent to marry do not
seem to have had much of an effect on the ages at which young people have chosen to marry over the years.
Id.
124 At common law, and well into the nineteenth century, parental control meant control by the father.
See Henry H. Foster & Doris Jonas Freed, Life With Father: 1978, 11 FAM. L.Q. 321, 322 (1978).
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[The father] may lawfully correct his child, being under age, in a

reasonable manner; for this is for the benefit of his education. The
consent or concurrence of the parent to the marriage of his child
under age, was also directed by our ancient law to be obtained; but
now it is absolutely necessary; for without it the contract is void.
And this also is another means, which the law has put into the
parent's hands, in order the better to discharge his duty; first, of
protecting his children from the snares of artful and designing
persons: and next, of setting them properly in life, by preventing the
ill consequences of too early and precipitate marriages.... The legal
power of the father... over the persons of his children ceases at the
age of twenty-one; for they are then enfranchised by arriving at years
of discretion, or that point which the law has established (as some
must necessarily be established) when the empire of the father, or
other guardian, gives place to the empire of reason.12
In other words, when the law delegated power to the parent to override a
child's decision, or when it later, in cases such as the prohibition of child labor
itself, sought to override decisions of both parent and child, it did so in recognition of the incapacity of the minor to make responsible choices. Against this
overall legal background, the basic philosophy of the juvenile court fits well.
Indeed, it would be jarringly inconsistent to cordon off criminal law as a separate area in which a minor's choices are treated as the equivalent of an adult's,
and where our assumptions about the criminal's free choice to transgress, with
full knowledge of both the consequences to others and the risks to his own life,
validate society's insistence on full retribution.
In recent decades, more attention has been given to the rights of children. 26
To a large extent, this has meant an emphasis on rights as positive entitlements
to such things as education and health care.2' However, there also has been a
clear trend toward giving more weight to the significant life decisions of minors, by allowing them to share to some extent in the experience of autonomy
rights enjoyed by adults. To be sure, this trend has not eliminated all paternalism from the legal treatment of adolescents. Courts, for example, continue

125

1%VILLIAMBLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES *440-41.

126 This is true on an international, as well as a national, level. See Karen A. McSweeney, Note, The
Potentialfor Enforcement of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: The Need to Improve
the Information Base, 16 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 467 (1993). Not all have welcomed the expanded
recognition of children's autonomy rights. See, e.g., Bruce C. Hafen & Jonathan 0. Hafen, Abandoning
Children to Their Autonomy: The UnitedNations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 37 HARv. INT'L L.J.
449 (1996).
127 See McSweeney, supranote 126, at 470-71.
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to draw distinctions between the First Amendment rights of adolescents and
adults to speak' and to receive information I2 in some contexts. In isolated
cases, such as the reinstitution of twenty-one as the minimum age for purchasing alcohol,"o a movement away from adolescent autonomy can be seen.
However, on the whole, the legal system gives more weight to adolescent
autonomy than it did in earlier decades.
In many states, a judge now must consider a child's preference in custody
disputes; 3' in some states, the preferences of older children may be dispositive
of the issue.1 A number of states have now permitted older children to consent to medical treatment without the consent of a parent, either generally'33 or
in particular circumstances. '34 Courts and legislatures have significantly expanded the range of contracts by minors that are non-voidable. Perhaps the
most visible, and certainly most politically and legally contentious, set of legal
issues regarding teenagers' rights to unilaterally make significant life choices
has emerged in the area of contraception and abortion.
When the Supreme Court held that married people have a constitutional
right of137access to contraceptives, 3 and then extended that right to unmarried
adults, it did not inevitably mean that the right would be extended to minors.
128 See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (holding student speech may be
limited "even though the government could not censor similar speech outside the school"); Bethel Sch. Dist.
No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (holding First Amendment rights of public school students "not
automatically coextensive with those of adults").
129 See, e.g., F.E.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (holding government may restrict access of
minors to some forms of speech that cannot be restricted to an adult audience).
130 See supranote 119.
t31 See Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector, A Review of the Year in Family Law: Of Welfare Reform,

Child Support, and Relocation, 30 FAM. L.Q. 765, 805 tbl.2 (1997). Only seven states do not consider the
wishes of the child as a factor in awarding custody. Id.
132 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 30-127 (1980); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.008 (West 1996).
133 See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-3(g)-(h) (1993). This statute empowers any emancipated minor,
as well as "any unemancipated minor of sufficient intelligence to understand and appreciate the consequences of the proposed surgical or medical treatment" to effectively give consent to any legal medical
treatment or procedure. Id.
134 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 144.341-.347 (West 1998). This statute empowers any minor to give
effective consent for treatment related to pregnancy, venereal disease, or alcohol or drug abuse. Id.
135 Thus, a minor may be liable under a contract for "necessaries." See John D. Hodson, Annotation,
Infant's Liabilityfor Medical, Dental, or Hospital Services, 53 A.L.R. 4TH 1249, 1254 (1987). In some
cases, a minor may be liable for contracts made under a misrepresentation of the minor's age. See A.D.
Kaufman, Annotation, Infant's Misrepresentationas to His Age as Estopping Him from Disaffirming His
Voidable Transaction,29 A.L.R. 3D 1270 (1970). A few states have gone further. See Stephen Wolfe, Note,
A Reevaluation of the ContractualRights of Minors, 57 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 145, 153-54 (1988).
136 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
137 See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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Cases in other areas of constitutional law had permitted the state greater control over the acts of minors than adults, even where core constitutional rights
were at stake."' In 1977, the Supreme Court, at least haltingly, extended the
right of access to contraception to teenagers by striking down a New York
statute that absolutely prohibited anyone from distributing contraceptives to
minors under age sixteen, and limited such distribution to persons over age
sixteen to licensed pharmacists.Y9 This was not an unambiguous declaration
of the autonomous rights of minors. Although the plurality opinion suggested
that there was little reason to define reproductive rights more narrowly when
minors were involved, '4 concurring justices pointed out that the New York
statute could also be read as interfering with parents' rights to make decisions
for their own children, as it contained an absolute prohibition on providing
contraceptives to those under sixteen, regardless of parental consent.'4 ' And
since 1977, there has been no definitive resolution of the question of whether a
state attempt to condition access to contraceptives
42 by teenagers on parental
challenge.
constitutional
withstand
would
consent
But even if the Constitution gives states an opportunity to condition teenagers' access to contraceptives on parental consent, it is an opportunity that
most states have declined. Most states explicitly grant minors the right to give
their own consent for family planning services,' 43 and some of those that do not
explicitly grant the right have not explicitly denied it. 44 Thus, even when not
compelled to do so, more states are giving more deference to minors in the
area of reproductive choice. Abortion, of course, is an even more contentious
subject than contraception. Since Roe v. Wade 45 established the fundamental
138 See supranote 128 and accompanying text discussing First Amendment cases. See also supranotes
45-50 and accompanying text.
139 See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
14o Id. at 693 ("Mhe right to privacy in connection with decisions affecting procreation extends to minors as well as to adults.").
141 See id. at 708 (Powell, J., concurring) ('T]his statute would allow the State to 'enquire into, prove,
and punish' . . . the exercise of this parental responsibility."); id. at 713 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("I would
describe as 'frivolous' appellees' argument that a minor has the constitutional right to put contraceptives to
their intended use, notwithstanding the combined objection of both parents and the State.").
142 Lower courts have held that publicly funded programs that distribute contraceptives to teenagers
without parental consent do not violate parents' rights. See Doe v. Irvin, 615 F.2d 1162 (6th Cir. 1980); but
see Alfonso v. Fernandez, 606 N.Y.S.2d 259 (App. Div. 1993) (holding that condom distribution by public
schools constituted health service and, under New York law, parents must be provided option of opting out
of program for their children).
143 See Rhonda Cohn, Minor'sRight to Consent to Medical Care, 1985 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 286, 29198.
144 See id.
1,5 410U.S. 113 (1973).
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right of access to abortion, one of the most consistently disputed subsidiary issues has been the authority of the state to mandate parental consent or notification. 146 Several decisions over the years have established that states may not
permit parents to have an effective veto over their daughter's abortion decision, while at the same time refusing to recognize, at least explicitly, an unfettered abortion right of the minor.' 4' States are permitted to maintain a system
of parental notification or consent if they also permit a minor to "bypass" her
parents and gain approval from a judge. 48 The judge is to make an initial determination as to whether the minor is mature enough to make the choice herself; if so, she must be permitted to have the abortion. 49 If the judge determines that the minor is not sufficiently mature, the abortion may be barred, but
in practice, it appears that a large majority of minors using the judicial bypass
route are found to be mature, and an even larger (something approaching
100%) majority are granted the right to proceed with the abortion. 5 "
In Hodgson v. Minnesota,' a case involving state-imposed restrictions on
the abortion rights of minors, the Supreme Court noted that "the right to make
this decision 'do[es] not mature and come into being magically only when one
attains the state-defined age of majority.""' 2 This increased level of deference
to adolescent decision-making is apparent not only in matters of reproductive
freedom, but in a wide range of contexts, and is being recognized by
legislatures as well as courts. When this deference occurs in matters involving
reproductive freedom and a range of other issues apart from questions
concerning assigning responsibility for criminal activity, political liberals have,
for the most part, applauded while political conservatives have been critical.
146 See generally Jon F. Merz et al., A Review ofAbortion Policy: Legality, Medicaid Funding, and ParentalInvolvement, 1967-1994, 17 WomE, 's RIGHTS L. REP. 1 (1996).
147 See Planned Parenthood of Kan. City v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S.
622 (1979); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
148 See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643 ("[I]f the State decides to require a pregnant minor to obtain one or both
parents' consent to an abortion, it must also provide an alternative procedure whereby authorization for the
abortion can be obtained.").
149 See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643-44.
150 See Patricia G. Barnes, Minors Seeking Abortions FindNo Court Resistance: Judges Approve 100
Percentof PetitionsSought by Teenagers,NAT'L LJ., March 13, 1995, at A8. This is not surprising, because the judge must approve the petition if either the minor establishes that she is "mature" or, if immature,
that the abortion would be in her best interests. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643-44. Thus, if a young woman is
mature, the court must defer to her decision; if she is immature, "[i]t is difficult to conceive of any reason..
. that would justify a finding that [her] best interests would be served by forcing her to endure pregnancy and
childbirth against her will." Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 475 (1990) (Marshall, J., concurring in
part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
151 497 U.S. 417 (1990).
152 Id. at 434-35 (quoting Danforth,428 U.S. at 74).
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But this political alignment is largely reversed when the issue is whether the
law should treat a minor's decision to commit a crime in the same way that it
treats a similar decision by an adult. On the surface, at least, each side seems
inconsistent. But before exploring the implications of this inconsistency,
perhaps we should pause to address an obvious question. What evidence is
there to support or refute the contention that the ability of teenagers to make
significant life decisions is noticeably less than that of adults? Is there
empirical support for the proposition that minors should be shielded from the
consequences of their choices, whether those consequences strike the majority
as favorable or unfavorable, in light of their reduced ability to choose
responsibly?
IV. How WELL CAN ADOLESCENTS MAKE MATURE LIFE DECISIONS?:
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

As we have seen, the law must, in a variety of contexts, explicitly or implicitly judge the competence of minors to make significant decisions about the
course of their lives. To the extent that minors exhibit competence no weaker
than that displayed by adults, it would seem to follow that those decisions
should be respected, at least no less than similar adult decisions. To respect a
decision can mean that we refrain from depriving the decision-maker from
enjoying the beneficial consequences of a decision by overriding it on the
grounds that those consequences are outweighed by negative consequences
either to the decision-maker or to others. But at the same time, to respect a decision can also mean that we refrain from shielding the decision-maker from
the negative consequences that will befall him or her arising from the decision.
The law's attitude toward the question of whether adolescent decisions should
be treated no differently than adult decisions has largely been based on assumptions regarding minors' decision-making competence, yet those attitudes
have varied over the years. Can we draw upon social science to provide some
reliable answers to questions regarding the relative decision-making competence of adults and adolescents, or are we left to muddle along with anecdotal
evidence and personal impressions?
In recent years, a body of work has begun to emerge regarding the quality
of adolescent decision-making, and its similarity or difference to that of
adults."S3 While the work has produced some interesting conclusions, those
153 See Jennifer L. Woolard et al., Theoretical and Methodological Issues in Studying Children's Ca-
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conclusions have been criticized as being uncertain, indefinite, and based on
imperfect assumptions. Still the work is interesting, as it suggests, if not clear
answers, at least avenues for further inquiry.
A number of relatively early studies built on what Elizabeth Scott calls the
"informed consent framework,"'' m that is, the question of whether teenagers
exhibit competence in those aspects of decision-making on which the law has
traditionally focused in determining competence, such areas as consent to
medical treatment. The informed consent framework works from the premise that the subjective values of the individual may not be questioned. Lack of
competence is instead concerned with the extent to which the individual falls
short of the model of the rational decision-maker, that is, one who is presented
with and understands information relevant to a decision, including its relevance to the individual's own situation, and who can compare the benefits and
dangers of alternative choices. 116 In other words, if the process of making a
decision resembles that employed by one who is clearly competent (e.g., an
adult) then the fact that the choice is quite different than that which would be
made by most competent decision-makers is not evidence of incompetence. It
is merely evidence of a different set of values, and to interfere on that basis
would be inadmissible paternalism.
For the most part, studies limiting themselves to these cognitive elements
of decision-making have supported the conclusion that there is little if any
difference between the decision-making competence of at least older
adolescents and that of adults.'57 These studies have been criticized on several
grounds: for example, for relying too much on laboratory simulations instead
of real-life situations,'58 for focusing on samples that overrepresent white,
middle class teenagers,09 and for attempting to generalize decision-making
competence from an assessment of that competence in a particular narrow

pacitiesin Legal Contexts, 20 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 219 (1996). In addition to providing an overview of the
issues, the authors collect dozens of social science articles on the subject of juvenile competence as references. See id. at 227-28.
154 Elizabeth S.Scott et al., Evaluating Adolescent Decision Making in Legal Contexts, 19 LAw & HUM.
BEHAV. 221,223 (1995).

'55 See id. at 223-24.
156 See id. at 224.
157 See id. at 224-26.
158 See id.
at 226 ("With few exceptions ...

no adequate research compares adolescent and adult performance under conditions that adequately resemble daily life.").
159 See id.
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setting. ' 60 Many, perhaps most, of these studies focused on decision-making in
the context of medical treatment. The most obvious and immediate legal
application of these findings, given their focus on medical decisions, is in the
highly contentious area of the legal treatment of reproductive decisions,
particularly abortion. Elizabeth Scott has asked if the researchers' eagerness to
bolster support for teenagers' rights to elect to have abortions free from
parental control may have led them to exaggerate the strength of their findings
concerning the competence of adolescent decision-making.' 6' Still, despite
their flaws, these studies do provide at least tentative support for the
proposition that, in terms of cognitive factors, older adolescents are not clearly
distinguishable from adults in their decision-making capacity. 62
Recently, however, several social scientists have challenged the notion that
the quality of decision-making should be assessed only by examining the ability to reason and process information. Instead, they contend that a range of
other factors might lead adolescents to significantly different outcomes than
adults when confronted with significant life choices. The traditional "informed
consent" model, defers to the subjective values of the individual decisionmaker. It does not permit a large difference in the subjective values of two
groups, that leads those groups to significantly different decisions, to act as
evidence of one of those groups' relative lack of competence. But if research
shows that, as a group, adolescents are likely to disproportionately choose
courses of action that most adults would avoid, it may well indicate that these
are significant differences in the decision-making processes employed by
adults and adolescents. If this is true, there might be good reason to consider
160 See id. at 225 n.3.
161 As Scott and her counterparts said:

In our view, it is unfortunate that the most prominent application of social science research to legal policy in this area has been on the issue of abortion decision making. The ideological and
highly controversial nature of this issue has distorted scientific discourse, because opinion on the
underlying issue tends to color the response to the use of empirical data.
Id. at 224 n.2. For examples of studies concluding, in the context of abortion, that adolescent decisionmaking is not significantly different than that of young adults, see Bruce Ambuel & Julian Rappaport, Developmental Trends in Adolescents' Psychological and Legal Competence to Consent to Abortion, 16 LAw
& HUM. BEHAV. 129 (1992); Victoria Foster & Norman A. Sprinthall, Developmental Profiles of Adolescents and Young Adults Choosing Abortion: Stage Sequence, Decalage, and Implicationsfor Policy, 27
ADOLESCENCE 655 (1992); Lois A. Weithom & Susan Campbell, The Competency of Children and Adolescents to Make Informed Treatment Decisions,53 CILD DEv. 1589 (1982).
162 See Thomas Grisso, Society's Retributive Response to Juvenile Violence: A DevelopmentalPerspective, 20 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 229, 233 (1996) ("In general, these studies have found that midadolescents'
performance on decision tasks is not remarkably different from that of adults, suggesting that differences in
their cognitive capacities to make choices are minimal.").
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the necessity of some degree of paternalism in the law's response to adolescent
choices.
An examination of non-cognitive factors in adolescent decision-making
might focus on a number of possible differences with adult decision-making.
It might be hypothesized that adolescents are more subject to external influence in determining their values, depending to a great degree on peer group
approval or parental attitudes, either as a model to follow or a set of values to
reflexively reject. 63 If so, the extent to which an adolescent can be said to be
responsible for his or her decision is diminished, as is the strength of the adolescent's claim to autonomy rights.'"T It might be hypothesized that teenagers
are more impulsive and moody than adults. Their relatively high level of participation in risky activity might, then, be not merely the result of rational calculation, but rather a non-cognitive attribute of youth, an attribute likely to diminish with age.'5 Again, this at least raises questions regarding the extent to
which the adolescent is fully responsible for significant life choices.
Lawrence Kohlberg 66 and others' 67 have argued that moral development is,
to some extent, linked to age. These theories generally contend that moral reasoning proceeds in stages, and that an individual will move through these
stages in a predictable order, one that generally proceeds from making moral
decisions based upon purely selfish concerns to a progressively greater concem with the consequences of the decision on others.'6 While this progression, and its stages, are not linked to any specific age, the concept of moral development does suggest that age and experience, or the lack of it, might well
have an impact on the ability to make responsible choices.

163 See Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment in Adolescence: Psychosocial
Factorsin Adolescent Decision Making, 20 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 249,253-54 (1996).
164 See id. at249-51.
165 See id. at 258 ("The higher prevalence of willful risk taking in adolescence is not because adolescents do not perceive risks where adults see them. Indeed, there is substantial evidence that adolescents are
well aware of the risks they take.").
166 See 2 LAWRENCE KOHLBERO, ESSAYS IN MORAL DEVELOPMENT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL

DEVELOPMENT (1984).

167 See, e.g., CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S
DEVELOPMENT (1982); JEAN PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD (2d ed. 1965). Gilligan, while
critical of Kohlberg's framework as being insensitive to gender-based differences, does not dispute the fact
that individuals grow by moving beyond selfishness to greater concern for others. See GILLIGAN, supra, at
31-63.
168 See KOHLBERG, supra note 166, at 44-62, 172-205.
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A survey of the existing literature conducted by Lawrence Steinberg and
Elizabeth Cauffman on these non-cognitive factors shows results that are
tentative and incomplete, but that tend to support the notion that the
differences between older adolescents and younger adolescents are more
prominent than the differences between older adolescents and adults.' 69
Studies focusing on the ability to make decisions independently, that is, free of
parental or peer group influence, show that while peer group pressure clearly
increases in early adolescence, both peer pressure and parental influence
diminish during the high school years."o Older adolescents exercise more
independent judgment than younger adolescents, but the studies that establish
this do not go further and compare older adolescents to younger adults.''
Thus, as Steinberg and Cauffman note, "we do not know if gains in this aspect
of decision making continue to accrue after age [eighteen].' 72
A number of studies have examined impulsiveness, and sought to validate
or refute the common perception that adolescents crave sensation-seeking activity,, are moodier and more impulsive,'74 or are subject to the effect of
"raging hormones" associated with puberty,'75 all to the detriment of the ability
to make rational decisions in the same way as adults. These studies "point in
one general direction: Adolescents probably have more difficulty in controlling
their impulses than do adults. ' 76 But the available studies are too sparse to indicate the age at which this difference levels off or declines.'"
Kohlberg and others have demonstrated that there is a regular pattern in the
development of moral reasoning. ' An individual will begin in a highly egocentric state, with little ability to take a broader perspective on the consequences of his or her acts, and will usually progress to a position where the
concerns of others are appreciated, at least to some extent. ' 9 Critics of Kohlberg have disputed particular aspects of his theories of moral development.
Feminists such as Carol Gilligan, for example, maintain that Kohlberg ignores
See Steinberg & Cauffman, supranote 163.
See id. at 253-54.
171 See id.
172 Id. at 254.
173 See id. at 259-60 (providing citation and discussion of these studies).
169

1711

See id. at 261-62 (providing citation and discussion of these studies).
See id. at 260-61 (providing citation and discussion of these studies).
Id. at 262.
See id.
See supra notes 166-67.
179 See KoHLBERG, supranote 166, at 44-62.
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significant value differences between men and women in putting forward his
notions of the highest levels of moral reasoning, and does so in a way that unduly privileges typically male types of thought.8 0 Yet even Gilligan and other
critics do not fundamentally contest the notion that moral reasoning is a skill
that develops over time." Still, this does not lead us to the point where we can
draw a sharp line between adults and adolescents. This is true not because
moral reasoning typically develops quite rapidly in adolescence, but rather because, according to Kohlberg, a large majority of adults do not progress beyond "conventional moral8 thinking,"
a stage that most people reach during the
2
middle high school years.1
Finally, studies have explored time perspective; that is, the ability of individuals to appreciate long-term as well as short-term consequences of their actions. ' The research indicates, unsurprisingly, that the ability to assume a
long-term future orientation "grows gradually from childhood to young adulthood."'' There does not seem to be any particular point at which there is a
sharp increase; rather, the growth process is continuous. 5
Overall, Steinberg and Cauffman conclude that there is significant evidence of a difference between early and middle adolescence in terms of judgment-making capacity, but very little hard evidence of differences between late
adolescence and adulthood. 8 6 Their tentative policy conclusion is that "there
would appear to be a scientific basis within the psychological literature on
adolescent development for distinguishing under the law between individuals
who have, versus [those who] have not, reached the age of 17. ' 7
What are we to make of all of this? Does this evidence compel the law either to respect the life choices of adolescents or to refuse to do so? If it does
neither, does that explain or justify the inconsistency of many people on this
question as they jump from issue to issue? What lies behind the law's inconsistency on this point?

18o
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184

See GILLIGAN, supra note 167.
See id.
KOHLBERG, supranote 166, at 44-62.
See Steinberg & Cauffman, supranote 163, at 266.

id.
185 See id.

186 See id. at 267-69.
187 Id. at 268.
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V. How WELL CAN ADOLESCENTS MAKE MATURE LIFE DECISIONS?:
POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The social science data currently available, as we have seen, provides at
least tentative, provisional support for the proposition that older adolescents,
those aged seventeen and above, have essentially the same capacity to make
significant life decisions as adults. Below that age, noticeable differences appear. Surely further research is warranted; these findings are far from conclusive. But as debate continues on public policy issues involving adolescents,
including the decision as to whether a separate and less punitive juvenile justice system should continue to exist, the evidence that we have should certainly
influence our resolution of these issues.
Paternalism in the American legal system, with its efforts to shield individuals from the negative consequences of their own actions is, wisely or not,
widely rejected."' Exceptions are made, for the most part, only where the individual or class of individuals involved clearly demonstrates an impaired
ability to appreciate the consequences of those actions. The power of these
principles seems clear in the debate over extending autonomy rights to adolescents in a wide range of contexts, but it has been much less salient in the area
of juvenile justice. In spite of all the overt discussion of deterrence, and to a
much lesser extent rehabilitation, in public discussion of criminal justice in
general, the central role played by the concept of retribution, the belief that the
choice to commit a crime must entail the acceptance of punishment proportionate to the actor's responsibility and the harm done, cannot be ignored. The
debate over the future of a separate and less punitive juvenile justice system,
however, has largely ignored this, focusing instead on questions of deterrence
and the efficacy of rehabilitation.'8 9
It would seem likely that the rejection of paternalism toward adolescents in
a wide range of legal contexts outside of the criminal law would, consciously
or unconsciously, lead to the rejection of paternalism toward adolescents in juvenile justice. A consistent set of findings with respect to the ability of minors
to make mature life decisions, then, should create some dissonance for both
liberals and conservatives. If adolescents, or at least older adolescents, are no
less capable of exercising choice than adults, then conservatives will be hard
pressed to defend limiting their autonomy in areas such as reproductive rights
188 See supranote 88.
189 See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
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and abortion, but at the same time, liberals will find it difficult to promote a
less punitive system of juvenile justice. A consistent set of findings that adolescents are, in fact, less capable of mature choice will lead to the opposite set
of conclusions, but will create an equal amount of dissonance. How can and
should this dissonance be resolved? Several approaches suggest themselves.
A. Ignore the Dissonance: Most People Are Merely Consequentialists
Of course, the premise of this Article, that both a rejection of paternalism
and support for the value, of logical consistency are widely shared in the legal
and political system, may simply be incorrect. If so, both liberals and conservatives may merely be acting as consequentialists in pursuit of different values.
There may, then, be no real dissonances to resolve.
Despite the recent revival of retributionist thinking in criminal law,' there
can be little doubt that many people explicitly or implicitly rely on notions of
deterrence in forming their opinions on criminal law policies."" For such people, if harsh penalties deter others, it may be largely irrelevant that they are not
fully deserved by those on whom they are imposed. Similarly, if a consequentialist regards abortion as a horrendous outcome, he will have no hesitation
adopting policies that are designed to reduce its incidence; the issue of whether
a teenager is as well-positioned as an adult to make the choice will become irrelevant. Given the inability to restrict the freedom of adults, limiting the freedom of minors will be advocated as a partial solution.' 92 Similarly, the dissonance of the typical liberal may also be explained by a rejection of the
retribution/personal responsibility model in criminal law. If one works from
the position that the principal goal of the penal system should be rehabilitation,
then one might readily adopt a paternalistic stance in order to justify a rehabilitative approach to juvenile justice. Of course, a rehabilitative model should
be applied to adults as well, one might believe. However, because this is
clearly unrealistic as a political matter at this time, half a loaf is better than
none. Teenage autonomy might then be respected in decision-making contexts
without creating much dissonance because of a largely consequentialist conclusion as well-that is, that the harms of outcomes like teenage pregnancy
outweigh the harms of things like abortion and ready access to contraception.
Respect for autonomy may, then, be less of a true basis for forming positions,

19

See supra notes 69-79 and accompanying text.

191 See supranotes 18-22 and accompanying text.

192 See supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
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either liberal or conservative, than an argument adopted for the purpose of
aiding consequentialist ends, consciously or unconsciously adopted due to its
resonance with the longstanding American reverence, at least in our rhetoric,
for the autonomy of the individual.
It would be difficult to deny that American law is largely shaped by a
pragmatic concern for achieving outcomes thought desirable by majorities or
influential minorities, regardless of whether these outcomes can all be reconciled with each other, let alone with some overriding philosophy. Still, most of
those involved in the legal system at least like to think of themselves as consistently applying a coherent set of values. To simply disregard the dissonance
created by inconsistent treatment of adolescent autonomy would be to ignore
something significant.
B. Justify the Dissonance: Some Questionsfor FurtherResearch
An alternative explanation for the apparent dissonance in the positions of
both liberals and conservatives might be an instinct that there really is no single answer to the question of the decision-making competence of adolescents,
even adolescents of the same age. Perhaps that competence varies in different
contexts, and the ability to make a responsible decision as to things like health
care and reproduction issues is noticeably different from the ability to choose
to obey or not obey the criminal law. Or perhaps competence varies between
subgroups of teenagers. Because most serious crimes committed by teenagers
are committed by males and the decision to have an abortion is made by females, if there are gender differences in the age at which adolescents make decisions in a way comparable to adults, there may be reason for varying the degree of the law's paternalism. Similarly, adolescents of different social class
and background may mature at different rates.
Making such distinctions would, however, present serious problems. A
categorical rule that treats adolescent girls and adolescent boys differently presents obvious Equal Protection Clause problems.9 While treating the class of
adolescents who choose to commit crimes differently than those who choose to
exercise reproductive freedom does not present the same problems of facial

193 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (invalidating system of different legal drinking ages for
young males and females). But not all differential treatment of young people based upon gender is invalidated. See Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (upholding statutory rape statute that made
men alone liable for sexual intercourse with a minor).
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gender bias,' 94 however, the obvious disparate impact surely raises interesting
questions, even if it would not invalidate the practice as a matter of constitutional law.'9s Perhaps this leads to the conclusion that categorical rules are
therefore inappropriate, and that the degree to which adolescents' decisions are
entitled to respect must be assessed and on an individual basis. This would
support case-by-case determinations of whether a juvenile offender should be
referred to the adult system, and at the same time, case-by-case consideration
of whether an adolescent's reproductive decisions should be respected. Of
course, this is precisely the system that now exists on these issues in many jurisdictions,' 9' and yet as we have seen, the political pressures in both cases
seem to be leading to more categorical rules."" In any event, the question of
whether there is social science support for the adoption of different attitudes
toward adolescent autonomy for different subgroups or with respect to different types of decisions is one that has yet to be addressed. Of course, it is possible that future research will fail to find significant differences between different types of decisions, and even if these differences are established, it will
still appear inconsistent and troubling to many to treat different types of adolescent decisions with different degrees of respect.
C. Resolve the Dissonance: Reconsider Positionson Legal Paternalism
Toward Adolescents
As the law extends more respect to the autonomy rights of adolescents,
pressure grows to subject teenagers to the full measure of adult criminal responsibility for their transgressions. The consistency of these developments
should be obvious, but seems largely ignored by many who oppose one but not
the other. Those who favor the maintenance of a separate and less punitive juvenile justice system should give serious thought to the question of whether
194 Craig and Michael M. both involved statutes that explicitly classified on the basis of gender. The
Court has been more accepting of statutes that classify without reference to gender, despite the obvious disparate effect of the statute favoring or disfavoring members of only one gender. See, e.g., Massachusetts v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (upholding state "veterans preference" in hiring despite fact that it overwhelmingly benefited males); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (holding that state disability insurance program could exclude pregnancy and childbirth expenses, despite fact that they are incurred only by
women).
195 The overwhelming majority of those under age 18 arrested are male. See. e.g., FED. BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, supra note 55, at 221, 223. In 1995, for example, almost 1.5 million males under age 18
were arrested, compared to less than 0.5 million females. The disparity is even greater for violent crimes.
See id.
196 See Schulhofer, supra note 57, at 435-38.
197 See id. at 438-39.
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such a system can be sustained in a legal world that otherwise respects
autonomous decisions made by adolescents.
It is difficult to refute the basic idea put forward by a sophisticated theory
of retribution that a deliberate, mature, rational decision to break the law warrants a punitive, rather than merely a remedial, response. One can effectively
contend, however, that a decision to break the law is not deliberate, mature,
and rational. If the legal system regards adolescent decision-making in general
as lacking sufficient maturity to deserve respect, it would follow that a decision by an adolescent to break the law should likewise call for a paternalistic,
remedial response.'98 But where the legal system, as it has in recent decades,
moves sharply in the direction of eschewing paternalism and respecting adolescent autonomy in a wide range of contexts, it is hardly surprising that simultaneously that system should reject paternalism in criminal law. If anything, the failure of the legal system to do so would be something that called
out for explanation. It is not the purpose of this Article to decide in favor of or
against a consistent position of respect for adolescent autonomy. Nor do I
mean to reject either the possibility that there might be some virtue in taking
seemingly inconsistent positions on issues of adolescent autonomy as politically prudent compromises in pursuit of some other goal, such as an overall
commitment to rehabilitation or deterrence as the highest good of the criminal
justice system. However, given the tendency to address issues as if they are
completely separate, it is surely worth considering by both sides of the debate
on the future of the juvenile justice system, that on a theoreticil level, support
for adolescent autonomy in a wide range of non-criminal justice contexts
clashes with a commitment to a more paternalistic, rehabilitative approach to
juvenile crime as compared with adult crime. Conversely, opposition to adolescent decision-making rights concerning reproductive choice conflicts, at
least on a theoretical level, with the position that juveniles and adults are
equally responsible for their crimes. In contemporary legal discourse, to label
something as paternalism is almost always to disparage it. Perhaps this is correct; perhaps it overlooks some virtues of paternalism. But both advocates and
opponents of paternalism in one context should understand that their arguments may resonate elsewhere in the legal system, sometimes in ways that they
may not find agreeable.

198 This would seem to be the general legal context in which the juvenile justice system was created.
See supra notes 23-27, 109-125 and accompanying text.
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